

To: The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)

7 April 2026

## **Request to investigate potential sanctions on individuals enabling serious human rights violations in the Sudan civil war.**

FairSquare is writing to request that the FCDO examine the role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Deputy Prime Minister, Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (henceforth Sheikh Mansour), in providing support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan and consider the imposition of sanctions under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020.

This request takes place in the context of what the UK government has described as overwhelming evidence of RSF atrocities in Sudan, which has included multiple massacres and instances of widespread sexual violence. The UK government has already sanctioned multiple individuals and entities linked to either the RSF or the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), who have been in armed conflict since June 2023.

Included in our submission is evidence from international humanitarian organisations with a presence on the ground in Sudan, whose analysis is that the conflict could escalate further and that the UAE could be a key actor in any escalation and widening of the conflict, especially in the light of new evidence linking the UAE to RSF supply lines originating in Ethiopia.

This document provides clear evidence that the UAE is the prime external driver of the conflict, and of Sheikh Mansour's role in this. To wit:

- There is an abundance of evidence from multiple credible sources, including the UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan, that the UAE has been providing weapons, ammunition, and other supplies to the RSF since June 2023 in violation of a 2004 UN embargo.
- In doing so the UAE has fueled the conflict, which has resulted in well-documented RSF atrocities in El-Fasher.
- The UAE has allowed individuals and entities linked to the RSF to coordinate their activities from the UAE, apparently unimpeded.
- Sheikh Mansour controls or has controlling influence over two of the UAE entities that funded a field hospital at an airport in Chad through which the UAE has funnelled arms and supplies to the RSF.
- Sheikh Mansour has been a senior and visible UAE interlocutor with the RSF before the outbreak of conflict in Sudan and since.
- US intelligence has intercepted calls between Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al-Nahyan and the RSF's commander General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, and US officials have personally confronted Sheikh Mansour about UAE support for the RSF.



- Sheikh Mansour controls International Media Investments, which part owns Sky News Arabia, which has been credibly accused of whitewashing RSF atrocities in Sudan.

In February 2026, the UK government participated in the formation of a new Coalition for Atrocity Prevention and Justice in Sudan, urging all countries to pursue greater protection for civilians.<sup>1</sup> If the UK is serious about its stated commitment to preventing further atrocities in Sudan, it must acknowledge credible evidence that the United Arab Emirates has played a significant role in supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Failure to do so risks enabling further atrocities and undermining efforts it has been leading to protect civilians.

UK sanctions on Sheikh Mansour, whose UK assets include his ownership of Manchester City Football club, which he has said he bought in a “private capacity” in 2008, would align with the goal of the UK sanctions regime to deter and disrupt malign activity.

## A. Timeline of key events in Sudan

- 2003** Conflict breaks out in the North Darfur region following a rebellion against the Sudanese government by opposition groups who accused the government led by President Omar al-Bashir of discriminating against its population. The Sudanese government responded with a bombing campaign and by arming a pro-government militia that came to be known as the *Janjaweed*, one of whose senior leaders was General Hemedti. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan emerged as a regional commander for the army, where he coordinated with the *Janjaweed*. The Darfur campaign by the Sudanese government led to charges of genocide by the U.S. Congress.<sup>2</sup>
- 2009** On 4 March 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant against al-Bashir for seven counts of Crimes Against Humanity based on al-Bashir's role as an "indirect perpetrator" in Darfur, including attacks on civilians and multiple crimes against humanity, including torture and rape.<sup>3</sup> The ICC issued a second warrant against al-Bashir in 2010, which included three counts of genocide.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> "UN Human Rights Council 61: UK Statement for the Enhanced Interactive Dialogue on Sudan". UK Government. 26 February 2026.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/un-human-rights-council-61-uk-statement-for-the-enhanced-interactive-dialogue-on-sudan>

<sup>2</sup> "Sudan: US Congress unanimously defines Darfur violence as 'genocide'. ReliefWeb. 23 July 2004.

<https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-us-congress-unanimously-defines-darfur-violence-genocide>

<sup>3</sup> "Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir". International Criminal Court. 4 March 2009.

[https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2009\\_01514.PDF](https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2009_01514.PDF)

<sup>4</sup> "Second Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest". International Criminal Court. 12 July 2010. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/court-record/icc-02/05-01/09-94>



- 2013** Al-Bashir restructured the Janjaweed as a separate unit called the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to militarily defeat rebel armed groups throughout Sudan. Human Rights Watch documented human rights violations committed by the RSF in 2014 and 2015.<sup>5</sup>
- 2019** The SAF and RSF jointly overthrew President al-Bashir following popular protests against his rule, and formed the Transitional Military Council. The UAE withdrew financial support to al-Bashir before his ouster and restored aid after the coup that toppled him.
- 2021** The SAF, led by General al-Burhan, took over the government in a coup, and the power-sharing body and transitional cabinet were formally dissolved, leading to the imprisonment of representatives from civilian groups. General Hemedti served as al-Burhan's deputy.
- 2023** On 15 April 2023, fighting broke out between the SAF led by General al-Burhan and the RSF, led by General Hemedti, following an internal power struggle that had taken place within the post 2021 government.

## B. The UK government's Sudan sanctions regime

1. The UK created new powers in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA), giving the government independent powers to impose, implement, enforce and lift sanctions. A cross-government review of sanctions implementation and enforcement outlined the purpose of sanctions.<sup>6</sup>

*"The UK deploys sanctions to isolate, restrict or change the behaviour of the actors targeted and to send a wider message. It uses sanctions for three purposes: More specifically, we use sanctions to:*

- **deter** malign activity, either aimed at preventing particular action or bringing it to an end
- **disrupt** malign activity, for example by denying access to resources such as military equipment, sensitive technology or funding
- **demonstrate** our values, for example to show disapproval or to defend international norms that are under threat"

<sup>5</sup> "Men With No Mercy" Rapid Support Forces Attacks against Civilians in Darfur, Sudan". Human Rights Watch. 9 September 2015.

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/09/men-no-mercy/rapid-support-forces-attacks-against-civilians-darfur-sudan>

<sup>6</sup> "Cross-government review of sanctions implementation and enforcement". UK Government. 15 May 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sanctions-implementation-and-enforcement-cross-government-review-may-2025/cross-government-review-of-sanctions-implementation-and-enforcement>



2. The United Nations (UN) imposes financial sanctions and requires member states to implement them through Resolutions passed by the UN Security Council. The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 impose financial, trade and immigration sanctions for the purpose of giving effect to the United Kingdom's obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions including 1556 (2004), 1591 (2005) and 2035 (2012) ('UNSCR 1556', 'UNSCR 1591' 'UNSCR 2035'); and the additional statutory purposes set out in the Regulations. This UK sanctions regime is aimed at promoting the peace, stability and security of Sudan, including through the promotion of respect for democracy, the rule of law and good governance, and an end to conflict.
3. The UK Government has imposed sanctions on individuals and entities accused of fuelling the war in Sudan, including those supporting the RSF and SAF, on five separate occasions: twice in 2023, once in 2024, once in 2025 and once to date in 2026. Since 2023, the UK government has imposed sanctions on 13 entities and 12 individuals in relation to Sudan.
4. On 12 July 2023, the UK government sanctioned 6 companies, 3 associated with the RSF and 3 associated with the SAF. According to the UK government, these businesses were "fuelling the devastating conflict in Sudan by providing funding and arms to the warring militias", and the sanctions would "limit their financial freedom by preventing UK citizens, companies and banks from dealing with them and put pressure on the parties to engage in the peace process."<sup>7</sup>
5. On 20 July 2023, the UK government introduced sanctions targeting Wagner Group leaders and businesses across Africa. This included 5 businesses and individuals, the UK government described as "involved in threatening peace and stability in Sudan, including through disinformation campaigns and providing military equipment".<sup>8</sup>
6. On 15 April 2024, the UK Government imposed new sanctions on businesses linked with financing the warring parties, 2 entities linked with the RSF and 2 linked with the SAF. Foreign Secretary David Cameron said: "This senseless and brutal war has devastated lives. A year on since the outbreak of fighting, we continue to see appalling atrocities against civilians, unacceptable restrictions on humanitarian access and an utter disregard for civilian life. The businesses that support the warring parties must be

<sup>7</sup> "UK sanctions businesses funding Sudan war". Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office. 12 July 2023. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-businesses-funding-sudan-war>

<sup>8</sup> "UK sanctions Wagner Group leaders and front companies responsible for violence and instability across Africa". Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 20 July 2023. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-wagner-group-leaders-and-front-companies-responsible-for-violence-and-instability-across-africa>



held to account, alongside those responsible for human rights abuses. The world must not forget about Sudan. We urgently need to end the violence.”<sup>9</sup>

7. On 12 December 2025, the UK government sanctioned four senior members of the RSF in response to the RSF’s actions in El Fasher in North Darfur.<sup>10</sup> It explained its rationale as follows: “The RSF’s actions in El Fasher are not random: they are part of a deliberate strategy to terrorise populations and seize control through fear and violence. The impact of their actions is visible from space. Satellite images of El Fasher show blood-stained sand, clusters of bodies, and evidence of mass graves where victims have been burned and buried. There needs to be accountability for these actions, and urgent steps taken to avoid this happening again. UK sanctioning of senior RSF commanders suspected of mass killings and sexual violence in El Fasher sends a clear message that those who commit atrocities will be held to account. This reflects the UK’s determination to prevent further atrocities.”<sup>11</sup>
  
8. On 5 February 2026, the UK government sanctioned six individuals who they said were “suspected of committing atrocities in the war in Sudan, or fuelling the conflict through the supply of mercenaries and military equipment.”<sup>12</sup> These included an RSF field commander, a SAF military commander, and three Colombian mercenaries involved in the recruitment of former Colombian military personnel to train and fight for the RSF. Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper said: “We will seek to dismantle the war machine of those who perpetrate or profit from the brutal violence in Sudan, and we will send a message to every individual responsible for commanding these armies and committing these atrocities that they will one day be held to account.”<sup>13</sup> The UK government statement further acknowledged the role of outside powers, stating: “Those atrocities have been fuelled by the supply of international mercenaries, which has prompted the UK to impose sanctions on a network of individuals suspected of recruiting and deploying former Colombian military personnel to train and fight for the RSF. Alongside this, we have targeted RSF weapons, procurement, and finance through the designation of the Director of the UK-sanctioned al-Khaleej bank.”<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> “UK sanctions businesses funding Sudan war”. Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office. 15 April 2024. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-businesses-funding-sudan-war-15-april-2024><https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-businesses-funding-sudan-war-15-april-2024>

<sup>10</sup> “UK sanctions commanders responsible for Sudan atrocities and pledges additional humanitarian support as Cooper says atrocities must not go unpunished”, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office”, 12 December 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-commanders-responsible-for-sudan-atrocities-and-pledges-additional-humanitarian-support-as-cooper-says-atrocities-must-not-go-unpunished>

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> “UK imposes fresh sanctions to dismantle Sudan’s ‘war machine’”, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 5 February 2026. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-imposes-fresh-sanctions-to-dismantle-sudans-war-machine>

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.



9. On 26 February 2026, the UK's Permanent Representative to the WTO and UN, Kumar Iyer said the following in a statement to the Enhanced Interactive Dialogue on Sudan:

*“The evidence of RSF atrocities is overwhelming: civilians forced to choose between starvation or eating animal feed; children subjected to mass rape; families ambushed and killed as they flee; and perpetrators calling for “extermination”. The Fact-Finding Mission warns that RSF violence in El Fasher bears the “hallmarks of genocide” – a chilling assessment we cannot ignore. As our Foreign Secretary stated: urgent international action is essential if these crimes are to be halted and victims have justice. The flow of weapons into Sudan must stop.”<sup>15</sup>*

## C. Situation in Sudan

10. In April 2023, intense fighting broke out between the SAF and the RSF. More than 150,000 people have been killed, with documented indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and more than 30 million people require humanitarian aid.<sup>16</sup> The conflict has been characterised not just by the scale of humanitarian need but the extent and brutality of the violence against civilian populations.<sup>17</sup>
11. According to the UNHCR, there are now 11.7 million people forcibly displaced as a result of the conflict, including 6.9 million people displaced internally and 4.5 million who have fled to neighbouring countries. Since the war began, Egypt has received the largest number of refugees, with more than 1.5 million people arriving from Sudan. South Sudan has received approximately 1.3 million refugees, while approximately 900,000 and 550,000 have fled to Chad and Libya, respectively. Uganda, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic have each received tens of thousands of Sudanese refugees.<sup>18</sup>
12. In September 2025, an estimated 21.2 million people - 45 per cent of the population - faced high levels of acute food insecurity according to the IPC-Integrated Food Security

<sup>15</sup> "UN Human Rights Council 61: UK Statement for the Enhanced Interactive Dialogue on Sudan". UK Government. 26 February 2026.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/un-human-rights-council-61-uk-statement-for-the-enhanced-interactive-dialogue-on-sudan>

<sup>16</sup> "Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help". International Rescue Committee. 6 February 2026.

<https://www.rescue.org/uk/article/crisis-sudan-what-happening-and-how-help>

<sup>17</sup> "A war on people: the human cost of conflict and violence in Sudan". Médecins Sans Frontières. 22 July 2024.

<https://www.msf.org/war-people-human-cost-conflict-and-violence-sudan>

<sup>18</sup> "Sudan Situation Map Weekly Regional Update - 23 FEB 2026". UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 23 Feb 2026. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/121259>



Phase Classification.<sup>19</sup> The WHO reported on 9 January 2026 - the 1000th day of the conflict that over 20 million people require health assistance and 21 million “desperately” need food.<sup>20</sup> A report by the Yale Research Lab found that the RSF has deliberately razed farming communities surrounding El-Fasher, Sudan in 2024 in an attempt to starve the local population, as part of their campaign of siege in the city.<sup>21</sup>

13. Recent advances by the RSF in western Sudan and the continued strength of the SAF in the east have effectively split the country into two zones of control. Both the RSF and SAF have been accused of war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law, including the killing of civilians.<sup>22</sup> Mediation efforts have repeatedly failed, and attempts to establish even limited ceasefires have been unsuccessful as both sides continue to receive political and material support from external actors. The situation for civilians has continued to worsen. Documentation by the OHCHR points to “over a two-and-a-half-times increase in killings of civilians” in 2025 compared with the previous year.<sup>23</sup>
14. In April 2025, the RSF and their allies launched a large-scale ground offensive on Zamzam camp, located around seventeen kilometres south of El Fasher and estimated to host over 500,000 people. During their attack on the camp, the RSF deliberately killed civilians, took hostages, pillaged and destroyed mosques, schools, and health clinics. The assault led to the displacement of 400,000 people.<sup>24</sup>
15. Violent conflict has intensified in the West, particularly in the city of El Fasher in North Darfur. In October 2025, after more than 500 days of siege, the RSF seized control of El Fasher. Human Rights Watch interviewed dozens of refugees who fled El Fasher to Eastern Chad and who recounted atrocities including multiple massacres, and

<sup>19</sup> "Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September 2025 and Projections for October 2025 - January 2026 and for February - May 2026". IPC - Integrated Food Security Phase Classification. 11 November 2025.

<https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159787/>

<sup>20</sup> "Sudan: 1000 days of war deepen the world's worst health and humanitarian crisis". World Health Organization. 9 January 2026.

<https://www.who.int/news/item/09-01-2026-sudan-1000-days-of-war-deepen-the-world-s-worst-health-and-humanitarian-crisis>

<sup>21</sup> "Special Report: Rapid Support Forces intentionally targeted agricultural communities to starve people in El-Fasher". Yale Research Lab. 10 March 2026.

<https://ysph.yale.edu/news-article/hri-report-rsf-intentionally-targeted-agricultural-communities-el-fasher/>

<sup>22</sup> United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner “A war of atrocities:” Sudan civilians deliberately targeted, UN Fact-Finding Mission reports international crimes on large-scale. 5 September 2025.

<sup>23</sup> "Human Rights Council hears of ongoing risk of further genocidal violence in Sudan". UN News. 12 February 2026.

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1167044>

<sup>24</sup> "Sudan: Rapid Support Forces' ruthless attack on Zamzam camp should be investigated for war crimes." Amnesty International. 3 December 2025.

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/12/sudan-rapid-support-forces-ruthless-attack-on-zamzam-camp-should-be-investigated-for-war-crimes/>



widespread sexual violence.<sup>25</sup> Through a systematic review of satellite imagery collected on or after 26 October 2025 through 1 November 2025, the Yale School of Public Health's Humanitarian Research Lab assessed with high confidence that the RSF engaged in widespread and systematic mass killing after gaining control of the city. This includes door-to-door and execution-style killings in areas where civilians were taking refuge.<sup>26</sup>

16. The UN Human Rights Office documented more than 6,000 killings in the first three days of the RSF offensive on El Fasher.<sup>27</sup> A United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan assessed that the mass killings and related atrocities committed by the RSF in and around El-Fasher, during its takeover of the city on or around 26 and 27 October 2025, "are indicators of a genocidal path".<sup>28</sup> The mission found that "genocidal intent is the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the RSF's systematic pattern of ethnically targeted killings, sexual violence, destruction, and public statements explicitly calling for the elimination of non-Arab communities, particularly the Zaghawa and Fur".<sup>29</sup>
17. In March 2026, Médecins Sans Frontières published a report into sexual violence in the conflict, describing it as a "defining feature" of the conflict.<sup>30</sup> Between January 2024 and November 2025, at least 3,396 victims and survivors of sexual violence sought treatment in MSF-supported facilities across North and South Darfur, though MSF warns this represents only a fraction of the true scale, as many victims and survivors cannot safely reach care. Following the RSF's capture of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, on 26 October 2025, MSF treated more than 140 victims and survivors.<sup>31</sup>
18. Following the seizure of El Fasher by the RSF, fighting in western Sudan has intensified, and civilians have continued to bear the brunt of the violence. In October 2025,

<sup>25</sup> "Interview: Investigating the Downfall of El Fasher, Sudan". Human Rights Watch. 5 February 2026.

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/05/interview-investigating-the-downfall-of-el-fasher-sudan>

<sup>26</sup> "RSF Systematic Mass Killings and Body Disposal in El-Fasher, North Darfur 26 October – 28 November 2025." Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health.

<http://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/001a93f9-1c99-4437-a023-bac1294d3d0e>

<sup>27</sup> "Sudan: RSF violations in capture of El Fasher amount to war crimes". Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 18 February 2026.

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/sudan-rsf-violations-capture-el-fasher-amount-war-crimes>

<sup>28</sup> "Sudan: Evidence in El-Fasher reveals genocidal campaign, targeting non-Arab communities, UN Fact-Finding Mission says". United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. 19 February 2026.

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/sudan-evidence-el-fasher-reveals-genocidal-campaign-targeting-non-arab>

<sup>29</sup> "Sudan: Evidence in El-Fasher reveals genocidal campaign, targeting non-Arab communities, UN Fact-Finding Mission says". United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. 19 February 2026.

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/sudan-evidence-el-fasher-reveals-genocidal-campaign-targeting-non-arab>

<sup>30</sup> "MSF report finds there are no safe places for women and girls in Darfur". Médecins Sans Frontières. 31 March 2026. <https://www.msf.org/msf-report-finds-no-safe-places-women-and-girls-darfur>

<sup>31</sup> "Ibid.



violations and abuses committed by the RSF and allied militias in and around El Fasher were documented by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.<sup>32</sup> In December 2025, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, warned that similar violations risked being repeated in the Kordofan region.<sup>33</sup> Attacks on civilians have continued into 2026 and on 11 February 2026, the United Nations reported that 57 civilians, including 15 children, were killed in separate drone strikes carried out by both the SAF and RSF over two days.<sup>34</sup> On 20 February 2026, a joint ministerial statement from the UK government, signed by 29 states, described those attacks as “affecting displaced civilians, health facilities, food convoys and areas near humanitarian compounds, resulting in a significant number of civilian deaths and injuries and is further disrupting humanitarian access and supply lines”.<sup>35</sup>

19. An international humanitarian organisation with a presence on the ground in Sudan and Chad has provided FairSquare with information that points to the likelihood of further escalations. In November 2025 they offered the following assessment of the situation:

*“The RSF will likely encircle El Obeid, North Kordofan’s capital, signalling a strategy of relentless sieges: encircling cities, severing supply lines, and pounding targets with drone strikes, as seen in El Fasher. Evidence of atrocities, including the RSF killing of around 40 people at a funeral outside El Obeid in November, indicate ongoing civilian protection risks, particularly for those suspected of supporting the SAF or allied armed groups. ...The humanitarian consequences of expanded conflict in the Kordofans will be catastrophic. Famine is already confirmed in Kadugli and may well be present in Dilling (both in South Kordofan) where food insecurity assessments have been unable to take place. As sieges tighten and new frontlines open, cutting off commercial and humanitarian supply lines, conditions will deteriorate rapidly. ...Attacks on North Kordofan’s agricultural areas pose a threat beyond the immediate region. As one of Sudan’s primary food-producing areas, disruption here will reverberate across the country, threatening national food security where 21 million people already face crisis or worse levels of hunger.”*<sup>36</sup>

<sup>32</sup> "UN Human Rights Chief warns against atrocities in Sudan's Kordofan region". Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 4 December 2025.

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/12/un-human-rights-chief-warns-against-atrocities-sudans-kordofan-region>

<sup>33</sup> "UN Human Rights Chief warns against atrocities in Sudan's Kordofan region". Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 4 December 2025.

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/12/un-human-rights-chief-warns-against-atrocities-sudans-kordofan-region>

<sup>34</sup> "Sudan: Rights chief alarmed after at least 57 killed in drone attacks in two days". UN News. 11 February 2026.

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166988>

<sup>35</sup> "Joint Ministerial Statement on protection of civilians and humanitarian operations in Sudan". Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office. 20 February 2026.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-ministerial-statement-on-protection-of-civilians-and-humanitarian-operations-in-sudan>

<sup>36</sup> Confidential briefing provided to FairSquare by an international humanitarian organisation..



20. In March 2026 the international humanitarian organisation offered the following assessment:

*Over 132,000 people have been displaced across the Kordofans since October 2025. Although the sieges in Kadugli and Dilling were partially lifted, civilians who endured months of encirclement have been left acutely malnourished. Kadugli center is experiencing IPC Phase 5 or famine levels of hunger, where people are starving to death every day. Dilling may well be experiencing similar levels of food insecurity, but a lack of data has prevented a formal classification. In Darfur, where famine was first declared in El Fasher, acute malnutrition has now surpassed famine thresholds in Um Baru and Kerno localities, putting children at severe risk of catching and dying from diseases like diarrhea, measles, or malaria. Historically, famine declarations have catalyzed political and funding responses. This time, the latest IPC report points to worsening conditions driven by funding shortfalls and a near-total absence of access to critically affected areas.*

21. In February 2026, the UK Foreign Secretary called for “all of those with influence on the RSF and the SAF not to fuel further conflict but instead to exert maximum pressure on them to halt the bloodshed, to pull back and to pursue a plan for peace.”<sup>37</sup>
22. A January 2026 report from the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court stated that “This conflict has been perpetuated by regional and international actors whose material and financial assistance only guarantees that this catastrophe in Darfur worsens and that war crimes and crimes against humanity will needlessly continue.”<sup>38</sup>

## D. UAE links to the Rapid Support Forces

### D.1. Support for political rise of RSF

23. According to a Reuters investigation, the UAE was a key figure in the ouster of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in a coup d’etat on 11 April 2019. “Sources, including a former government minister, a member of Bashir’s inner circle and a coup plotter, portrayed a leader who was skilled at manipulating and controlling rival Islamist and military factions in Sudan, but increasingly isolated in a changing Middle East.

<sup>37</sup> "Let this be the time that the world comes together to end the cycle of bloodshed in Sudan: UK statement at the UN Security Council". Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office. 26 February 2026.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/let-this-be-the-time-that-the-world-comes-together-to-end-the-cycle-of-bloodshed-in-sudan-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

<sup>38</sup> "42nd Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC)". International Criminal Court. 19 January 2026. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2026-01/2026-01-19-icc-report-unsc-darfur-eng.pdf>



...They described how Bashir mishandled one key relationship - with the United Arab Emirates".<sup>39</sup>

24. Senior UAE officials were said to be angered by al-Bashir's refusal to take sides in their diplomatic rift with Qatar, and by al-Bashir's refusal to root out political Islamists in his government. The UAE decision to suspend financial aid to Sudan was a catalyst in the protests that led to al-Bashir's ouster.<sup>40</sup>
25. The coup against al-Bashir was carried out jointly by the SAF and the RSF.<sup>41</sup> The Transitional Sovereignty Council that took over from al-Bashir was headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the SAF. The head of the RSF, General Hemedti served as his deputy.<sup>42</sup>
26. On 21 April 2019, ten days after the coup against al-Bashir, the UAE and Saudi Arabia announced a USD 3 billion aid package for Sudan.<sup>43</sup>
27. In the days after the coup senior UAE officials hosted a delegation of senior figures from Sudanese rebel and opposition groups in Abu Dhabi. Ahmed Tugod, a senior official in Darfur's rebel Justice and Equality Movement, who attended the talks, told Reuters that UAE officials wanted to hear their views on reconciliation and stability and that Sheikh Mansour oversaw contacts between the UAE and the rebel groups.<sup>44</sup>
28. The head of the RSF, General Hemedti, met Sheikh Mansour in the UAE, approximately seven weeks before fighting broke out between the RSF and the SAF. On 23 February 2023, the Emirates News Agency published a photo and brief details of their meeting, saying that "the two sides discussed the fraternal relations and opportunities of enhancing cooperation and joint work in various fields for the benefit of the development objectives and the two countries' aspirations."<sup>45</sup>

<sup>39</sup> "Abandoned by the UAE, Sudan's Bashir was destined to fall". Reuters, 3 July 2019.

<https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-bashir-fall/>

<sup>40</sup> "Abandoned by the UAE, Sudan's Bashir was destined to fall". Reuters, 3 July 2019.

<https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-bashir-fall/>

<sup>41</sup> "Civil War in Sudan", Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026.

<https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan>

<sup>42</sup> "Civil War in Sudan", Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026.

<https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan>; "Sudan crisis: Burhan and Hemedti - the two generals at the heart of the conflict", BBC News, 17 April 2023. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65297714>

<sup>43</sup> "Saudi Arabia, UAE to send \$3 billion in aid to Sudan", Reuters, 22 April 2019.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/world/saudi-arabia-uae-to-send-3-billion-in-aid-to-sudan-idUSKCN1RX0DG/>

<sup>44</sup> "Abandoned by the UAE, Sudan's Bashir was destined to fall". Reuters, 3 July 2019.

<https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-bashir-fall/>

<sup>45</sup> "Mansour bin Zayed receives Deputy Chairman of Transitional Sovereign Council in Sudan". 23 February 2023. Emirates News Agency. <https://www.wam.ae/en/article/hszrgjco-mansour-bin-zayed-receives-deputy-chairman>



## D.2. UAE as a base for the RSF

29. The RSF has used the UAE to store funds and procure supplies. In December 2019, Global Witness obtained what they called “an apparently genuine cache of leaked documents” that showed “the financial networks behind Hemedti and the RSF”. The documents showed that the RSF held a bank account under their own name at the National Bank of Abu Dhabi (now part of First Abu Dhabi Bank).<sup>46</sup> The documents also indicate that the RSF “bought over 1,000 vehicles during the first six months of 2019, from dealers in the UAE. The shipments included over 900 Toyota Hilux and Land Cruisers, models which the RSF frequently converts into “technicals” – 4x4 military vehicles mounted with machine guns.”<sup>47</sup>
30. The head of the RSF secured a portfolio of property in the UAE shortly after the coup against al-Bahsir. According to The Sentry, which accessed a database of leaked Dubai property records from 2020 and 2022, General Hemedti bought three apartments in Dubai’s eastern suburbs, close to the UAE’s Al Minhad military airbase in March 2020.<sup>48</sup>
31. On 7 January 2025, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned seven UAE-based companies that it linked to the Rapid Support Forces. Included in the sanctions list was one UAE-based holding company which the US Treasury Department said has “provided the RSF with money and military equipment.”<sup>49</sup>
32. The UAE issued a public response to the US sanctions on 4 April 2025, when the UAE Ministry of Justice issued a statement saying that it had “initiated its own investigation into the entities and related individuals” and “confirmed that none of the seven entities hold an active business licence in the UAE, nor are they currently operating in the UAE.”<sup>50</sup>

## D.3. UAE Provision of Weapons and Support to the RSF

33. In January 2024, the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan issued a 52-page report to the UN Security Council outlining the findings of its investigations into the conflict between the

<sup>46</sup>“Exposing the RSF’s secret financial network”. Global Witness, 9 December 2019.

<https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-resources/exposing-rsfs-secret-financial-network/>

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> “Dubai Properties Linked to Hemedti”, The Sentry, February 2026

<https://thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/TheSentryAlert-Feb26-Final.pdf>

<sup>49</sup> “Treasury Sanctions Sudanese Paramilitary Leader, Weapons Supplier, and Related Companies”. US Department of the Treasury. 7 January 2025. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2772>

<sup>50</sup> “Ministry of Justice: Seven companies sanctioned by US over Sudan do not own valid business licences or operate in UAE”. Emirates News Agency, 4 April 2025

<https://www.wam.ae/en/article/bj0byzv-ministry-justice-seven-companies-sanctioned-over>



Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces.<sup>51</sup> It found that the first phase of the conflict between the two groups in Darfur took place between April and July 2023, and that the second phase began in August 2023.

34. On 4 July 2023, the UAE announced that it would “build a field hospital in the Chadian city of Amdjarass to support Sudanese refugees.”<sup>52</sup> The UAE field hospital was not constructed in the town of Amdjarass, but at Amdjarass airport, approximately 10km from the town.<sup>53</sup> The airport was inaugurated in December 2022, with a runway length of 3,000 metres, enabling it to handle cargo flights.<sup>54</sup> Open source investigations indicated that the entity described by the UAE field hospital comprised approximately 35 tents of dimensions 9.5m x 5m.<sup>55</sup>
35. In August 2023, evidence emerged that the UAE was shipping weapons to Amdjarass airport. The Wall Street Journal reported that an aircraft bound for Amdjarass was checked by Ugandan officials when it landed at Entebbe airport in Uganda.<sup>56</sup> *When a cargo plane landed in Uganda’s busiest airport in early June, its flight documents said it was carrying humanitarian aid sent by the United Arab Emirates for Sudanese refugees. Instead of the food and medical supplies listed on the aircraft’s manifest, Ugandan officials said they found dozens of green plastic crates in the plane’s cargo hold filled with ammunition, assault rifles and other small arms.... The Ugandan officials who found the arms and ammunition on the June 2 flight said the Emirati plane was allowed to continue its trip to Amdjarass International Airport in eastern Chad. Subsequently, the Ugandan officials said, they received orders from their superiors to stop inspecting flights stopping over from the U.A.E. In recent weeks, there have been dozens more flights. “We are not allowed to inspect these planes anymore. They are now the responsibility of the defense ministry,” one of the officials said. “We have been warned not to take any pictures.”*<sup>57</sup>
36. In January 2024, the UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan identified the UAE’s operations in Amdjarass as a key factor in the escalation of the conflict. The report states that “since August the renewed military campaign of RSF to take control of the main cities of

<sup>51</sup> “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan S/2024/65”. UN Digital Library. 15 January 2024.

<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4039195?v=pdf>

<sup>52</sup> “UAE to establish field hospital in Amdjarass, Chad to support Sudanese refugees”, Emirates News Agency, 4 July 2023. <https://www.wam.ae/en/article/hszrhfx-uae-establish-field-hospital-amdjarass-chad>

<sup>53</sup> A series of open source investigations into the UAE operations at Amdjarass airport can be seen at “The UAE airlift to Amdjarass. Chad” Substack: Gerjon’s Airport Finds. 3 July 2023.

<https://gerjon.substack.com/p/the-uae-airlift-to-amdjarass-chad>

<sup>54</sup> “Amdjarass Airport inaugurated”. Centre for Aviation. 3 January 2023.

<https://centreforaviation.com/data/profiles/airports/amdjarass-airport-ftaa>

<sup>55</sup> “The UAE airlift to Amdjarass. Chad” Substack: Gerjon’s Airport Finds. 3 July 2023.

<https://gerjon.substack.com/p/the-uae-airlift-to-amdjarass-chad>

<sup>56</sup> “A U.S. Ally Promised to Send Aid to Sudan. It Sent Weapons Instead.”, Wall Street Journal. 10 August 2023.

<https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/a-u-s-ally-promised-to-send-aid-to-sudan-it-sent-weapons-instead-82d396f>

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.



Darfur resulted in an escalation of military means used by both sides” and “the RSF surge coincided with it securing new supply routes.”<sup>58</sup> The report states that “The Panel identified three main routes...for RSF supplies. The main one was through eastern Chad. Since June, various flight-tracking experts have observed a heavy rotation of cargo planes coming from Abu Dhabi International Airport to Am Djarass airport in eastern Chad, with stops in regional countries such as Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda.”<sup>59</sup>

37. The UN Panel of Experts said in its January 2024 report that there was credible evidence that the UAE was providing military support to the RSF through Amdjarass. Their report cited “several media reports claimed that the aircraft were transporting weapons, ammunition and medical equipment for RSF” and allegations made by the SAF Lieutenant-General and Sovereignty Council member, Yasir al-Atta, that Chad and the United Arab Emirates were providing military support to RSF through Am Djarass. The UN Panel of Experts stated that “the allegations were credible” citing information they had gathered from sources in Chad and Darfur. Amnesty International said they corroborated the findings of the UN Panel of Experts in this regard through interviews with 17 people, including eight security and weapons experts and nine Sudanese journalists and activists on various dates between February and March 2024.<sup>60</sup>
38. In a follow-up report published in April 2025, the UN Panel of Experts stated that it was “unable to confirm transfers of military materiel from Am Djarass to Darfur at the time of writing.” However, in a section of its report detailing “External support to RSF”, it identified Am Djarass airport as the starting point for RSF supply routes to three areas: “El Fasher”, “Omdurman/Khartoum”, and “Kordofan and beyond”.<sup>61</sup>
39. In December 2025, Reuters reported that Kufrah airport in southern Libya had become “a vital conduit for weapons, fuel and mercenaries to the RSF”.<sup>62</sup> Reuters cited “a U.N. official familiar with RSF operations”, speaking on condition of anonymity, as saying that RSF’s use of Kufrah had “changed the whole game” and bolstered the RSF’s siege of al-Fasher. Reuters also cited Justin Lynch, managing director of the Conflict Insights Group analysis firm, who said he identified at least 105 cargo plane landings at Kufrah between April 1 and November 1 by correlating satellite images with flight tracking data, and who said that the “pattern, location, and aircraft” of the flights into Kufrah “correlate with UAE support to the RSF”.

<sup>58</sup> “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan S/2024/65”. UN Digital Library. 15 January 2024. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4039195?v=pdf>

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> “New weapons fuelling the Sudan conflict”. Amnesty International. 25 July 2024.

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2024/07/new-weapons-fuelling-the-sudan-conflict/#f48>

<sup>61</sup> “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan”, United Nations Security Council, S/2025/239, 17 April 2025. <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/239>

<sup>62</sup> “How a remote airstrip in Libya reshaped Sudan’s civil war”. Reuters. 6 January 2026.

<https://www.reuters.com/world/how-remote-airstrip-libya-reshaped-sudans-civil-war-2025-12-22/>



40. In February 2026, Reuters reported the existence of a clandestine training camp in Ethiopia for thousands of RSF forces, supplying both logistical aid and military instructors. Sources include a senior Ethiopian government official, with the discovery of the camp constituting the first direct evidence of Ethiopia's involvement in the conflict.<sup>63</sup>
41. In March 2026, Le Monde reported that the UAE has been reorganising its arms supply network to the RSF including the use of Ethiopia and the Central African Republic as a result of pressure on routes in Chad and Libya.<sup>64</sup> Le Monde used flight-tracking websites to identify aircraft registered in the Central African Republic, which it linked to figures in the United Arab Emirates, to “illustrate the UAE's intention to develop new logistical routes from Sudan's neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia – where they established a training camp for their Sudanese allies in 2025 – and similarly in the Central African Republic.”<sup>65</sup>
42. There has been extensive documentation of the presence of UAE-linked Colombian mercenaries fighting for the RSF in Sudan. The US Treasury has sanctioned a retired Colombian military officer, Álvaro Andrés Quijano Becerra, based in the UAE, for his role in a network recruiting Colombian mercenaries to fight in the UAE.<sup>66</sup> In November 2025, the Sentry found evidence that showed an Emirati businessman supplying Colombian mercenaries to the RSF is a business partner of a high-level government official in the United Arab Emirates.<sup>67</sup> In December, an AFP report found that Colombian mercenaries were brought to Sudan via the UAE, where they received training, before onward journeys through “UAE-loyalist eastern Libya, and another through an airbase in Bosaso, Somalia that houses Emirati military officials”.<sup>68</sup> The UK government has itself acknowledged the role of Colombian mercenaries and sanctioned individuals involved in their recruitment and training.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>63</sup> "Ethiopia builds secret camp to train Sudan RSF fighters, sources say". Reuters. 11 February 2026.

<https://www.reuters.com/investigations/ethiopia-builds-secret-camp-train-sudan-rsf-fighters-sources-say-2026-02-10/>

<sup>64</sup> "The UAE is reorganizing its arms supply network for Sudanese paramilitaries". 22 March 2026. Le Monde.

[https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2026/03/22/the-uae-is-reorganizing-its-arms-supply-network-for-sudanese-paramilitaries\\_6751682\\_124.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2026/03/22/the-uae-is-reorganizing-its-arms-supply-network-for-sudanese-paramilitaries_6751682_124.html)

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Treasury Sanctions Transnational Network Recruiting Colombians to Fight in Sudan's Civil War. U.S. Department of Treasury. 9 December 2025. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0330>; "Colombian mercenaries in Sudan 'recruited by UK-registered firms". The Guardian. 19 December 2025.

<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/dec/19/colombian-mercenaries-sudan-rsf-us-sanctions-recruited-uk-registered-firms-investigation>

<sup>67</sup> Sudan Mercenaries Linked to Business Partner of Top UAE Bureaucrat. The Sentry. November 2025.

<https://thesentry.org/reports/sudan-mercenaries-rsf-uae-bureaucrat/#:~:text=Download%20the%20full%20alert.for%20the%20brutal%20paramilitary%20group.>

<sup>68</sup> "From the Andes to Darfur: Colombians lured to Sudan's killing fields". France 24. 21 December 2025.

<https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20251221-from-the-andes-to-darfur-colombians-lured-to-sudan-s-killing-field>

<sup>69</sup> "UK imposes fresh sanctions to dismantle Sudan's 'war machine'", Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 5 February 2026.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-imposes-fresh-sanctions-to-dismantle-sudans-war-machine>



43. At the same time as the UAE has been supplying weapons and supplies to the RSF, it has been extracting vast amounts of Sudanese gold, both legally and illegally. The Central Bank of Sudan reported that in 2024, almost 97% of official gold exports (from army-held areas) went to the UAE, earning \$1.52bn.<sup>70</sup> Analysis from SwissAid found that in 2024, the UAE imported 29 tonnes of gold directly from Sudan, up from 17 tonnes in 2023, along with significant quantities transiting through neighbouring countries: 27 tonnes from Egypt, 18 tonnes from Chad, and 9 tonnes from Libya. These last two countries serve as ‘exit points’ for gold controlled by the RSF. SwissAid’s report stated that the “patterns and flows confirm the UAE’s role as a major destination for smuggled Sudanese gold”.<sup>71</sup> Chatham House published research in 2025, which found that “The UAE continues to benefit from Sudan’s conflict gold, as the enforcement of restrictions on artisanal gold imports from countries where there is war or where gold is controlled by armed groups remains limited.”<sup>72</sup>
44. On 15 November 2025 the Telegraph reported that Sky News Arabia, which is part owned by the UAE, had broadcast information that downplayed the seriousness and extent of the RSF’s actions in El Fasher:

*One of the channel’s correspondents [identified by The Telegraph as being married to a senior RSF official] was filmed hugging a female commander in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group opposed to the government, who had previously urged fighters to carry out mass rape.... On Wednesday, the broadcaster released an interview with a doctor who claimed he had not seen a single dead body, even though nearly 500 people are thought to have been killed in the building where he worked....Other reporting also appears to have downplayed satellite images of piles of bloodied bodies.<sup>73</sup>*

According to The Telegraph, this was followed by articles on Sky News Arabia’s website suggesting that satellite imagery documenting evidence of RSF atrocities in El Fasher was false.<sup>74</sup> On 18 March 2026, The Telegraph reported that Sky was considering cutting links to Sky News Arabia in response to its reported allegations.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>70</sup> "As criticism grows, is UAE ready to walk away from Sudan’s RSF militia?". The Guardian. 4 November 2025. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/04/sudan-rsf-militia-uae-united-arab-emirates>

<sup>71</sup> "United Arab Emirates: More Than Ever a Hub for Conflict Gold". SwissAid. 4 November 2025. <https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/>

<sup>72</sup> "Gold and the war in Sudan". Chatham House. 26 March 2025. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/gold-and-war-sudan/02-securitization-sudans-gold-sector>

<sup>73</sup> "Sky News Arabia accused of whitewashing genocide". The Telegraph. 14 November 2025, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/11/14/sky-news-arabia-accused-of-whitewashing-genocide-sudan-uae/>

<sup>74</sup> Sky News to cut ties with UAE channel. The Telegraph. 18 March 2026. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2026/03/18/sky-news-to-cut-ties-with-uae-channel/>

<sup>75</sup> Sky News to cut ties with UAE channel. The Telegraph. 18 March 2026. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2026/03/18/sky-news-to-cut-ties-with-uae-channel/>



45. Social media analysis published by Professor Marc Owen Jones in December 2025 identified how a “bot farm” of social media accounts promoted RSF narratives about events in El Fasher, “whitewashed the massacre”, and propagated other UAE-aligned narratives.<sup>76</sup>

*Taken together, the evidence points to a massive, politically aligned influence operation being pushed by approximately 19,000 bots. In the weeks following the El Fasher massacre, roughly 80,000 tweets from around 21,000 accounts generated more than 91 million impressions, with an estimated 89–93 per cent of that activity driven by automated or highly coordinated accounts. These networks worked to rehabilitate the RSF as humanitarian and peace-seeking, externalise blame onto the SAF and its regional backers — Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, and Russia — and mute scrutiny of the UAE despite its ties to the RSF.*

## E. Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al-Nahyan’s links to RSF

46. Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al-Nahyan is one of the most senior figures in the UAE government. He is the Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister of the UAE, and Chairman of the Presidential Court. He is the brother of the UAE President, Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. He has been a key figure in the UAE’s foreign policy towards Sudan and has been a key interlocutor with the head of the RSF, General Hemedti.
47. In April 2019, in the days after the coup against Omar al-Bashir, Sheikh Mansour oversaw contacts between the UAE and Sudanese rebel groups in Abu Dhabi.<sup>77</sup>
48. Sheikh Mansour in the UAE met General Hemedti in February 2023 in the UAE approximately seven weeks before fighting broke out between the RSF and the SAF.<sup>78</sup>
49. The UAE announcement on 4 July 2023 that it would “build a field hospital in the Chadian city of Amdjarass to support Sudanese refugees” stated that it would be built “under the directives of President His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan” with financial contributions from three UAE charitable entities: the Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation, the Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan Charitable and Humanitarian

<sup>76</sup>“I found 19,000 UAE-aligned bots promoting the Rapid Support Forces after their atrocities in El Fasher”. Marc Owen Jones. 31 December 2025. <https://marcownjones.substack.com/p/i-found-19000-uae-aligned-bots-promoting>

<sup>77</sup> “Abandoned by the UAE, Sudan’s Bashir was destined to fall”. Reuters, 3 July 2019.

<https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-bashir-fall/>

<sup>78</sup> “Mansour bin Zayed receives Deputy Chairman of Transitional Sovereign Council in Sudan”. 23 February 2023. Emirates News Agency. <https://www.wam.ae/en/article/hszrgjco-mansour-bin-zayed-receives-deputy-chairman>



Foundation, and the Emirates Red Crescent (ERC) Authority.<sup>79</sup> Sheikh Mansour has direct links to two of these UAE entities. He is the chairman of the Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation, and has controlling influence over the Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation.<sup>80</sup>

50. In June 2025, the New York Times reported that “the United States has intercepted regular phone calls between General Hamdan and the leaders of the Emirates, including Sheikh Mansour.” The reporting did not say when these phone calls took place, but said that “the intelligence helped American officials conclude that the unassuming Emirati royal has played a central role in the effort to arm General Hamdan’s forces, inflaming a devastating conflict that has led to famine and the world’s biggest humanitarian crisis.”<sup>81</sup>
51. The New York Times reported that, according to a U.S. official, the U.S. envoy to Sudan, Tom Perriello, “confronted Sheikh Mansour personally in 2024 about his support for General Hamdan during a meeting in the Emirates.”<sup>82</sup> In August 2023, the Wall Street Journal reported that “people familiar with the Biden administration’s Africa policy said Washington is aware of the U.A.E.’s arms deliveries to the RSF and has made its concerns known to authorities in Abu Dhabi.”<sup>83</sup>
52. Sky News Arabia, which has been credibly accused of whitewashing RSF atrocities in Sudan, is a joint venture between UK-based Sky Group and the UAE-based International Media Investments (IMI) corporation. IMI is an investment vehicle that is controlled by Sheikh Mansour.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>79</sup> UAE to establish field hospital in Amdjarass, Chad to support Sudanese refugees”. Emirates News Agency. 4 July 2023. <https://www.wam.ae/en/article/hszrhfpx-uae-establish-field-hospital-amdjarass-chad>

<sup>80</sup> Khalifa Foundation: About us. <https://www.khalifafoundation.ae/en/khalifa-foundation/about-us>; Sheikh Mansour’s influence over the Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan Charitable Foundation is evident in the fact that he issued a resolution in March 2025 to restructure the Board of Trustees of the Foundation. See “[Mansour bin Zayed issues resolution to restructure Board of Trustees of Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation](#)”, Aletihad, 27 March 2025.

<sup>81</sup> “The Sheikh Who Conquered Soccer and Coddles Warlords”. New York Times. 29 June 2025. <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/29/world/middleeast/emirates-manchester-city-soccer-sudan.html>

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> “A U.S. Ally Promised to Send Aid to Sudan. It Sent Weapons Instead.”, Wall Street Journal. 10 August 2023. <https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/a-u-s-ally-promised-to-send-aid-to-sudan-it-sent-weapons-instead-82d396f>

<sup>84</sup> See “International Media Investments” information at State Media Monitor website <https://statemediamonitor.com/2025/07/international-media-investments-imi/> In 2023, a spokesperson for RedBird IMI, a consortium between IMI and the US media firm RedBird told Bloomberg that “IMI is a private investment vehicle for Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al Nahyan”; “Abu Dhabi-Backed Fund Targets Telegraph Control With Barclay Loan Deal”. Bloomberg. 20 November 2023. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-20/abu-dhabi-backed-fund-targets-telegraph-control-with-barclay-loan-deal>; “Abu Dhabi Media Investment Corp and British Sky Broadcasting form joint venture”. <https://hexus.net/ce/items/entertainment/27722-abu-dhabi-media-investment-corp-british-sky-broadcasting-form-joint-venture/>;



53. In January, former leader of the Conservative Party, Sir Iain Duncan Smith, called for the FCDO to carry out a full assessment of whether representatives of the UAE may meet the criteria for sanctions, given the UAE's support for the RSF.<sup>85</sup>

*As the ultimate owner of Manchester City football club, Sheikh Mansour is possibly the most high-profile UAE investor in the UK economy. What are we going to do about that? That is a serious problem for us. Will the Minister confirm that, given the appalling crimes of the RSF, which fall squarely in the purview of the global human rights sanctions scheme, the Department has carried out a full assessment of whether representatives of the UAE Government may meet the criteria for sanctions, given the significant role the UAE is alleged to play in support of the RSF and the substantial influence of the UAE on investments in the UK economy and public life? If such an assessment has not been carried out, will the Minister say whether it is the Government's intention to do so?*

54. Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al-Nahyan's UK assets include his ownership of Manchester City Football Club. Manchester City is the most high-profile and successful club in the City Football Group. City Football Group describes itself as "the world's leading private owner and operator of football clubs". It is "majority owned by Newton Investment and Development LLC, fully owned by His Highness Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, with a significant minority shareholding of nearly 17% held by US-based global technology investment firm, Silver Lake."<sup>86</sup> When Sheikh Mansour bought Manchester City in 2008, he wrote an open letter to Manchester City supporters saying that he had bought the club "in a private capacity."<sup>87</sup>

<sup>85</sup> "Human Rights Abuses: Magnitsky Sanctions". Hansard. 8 January 2026.

<https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2026-01-08/debates/81201EE2-559F-4340-BC3B-2E02355859D8/HumanRightsAbusesMagnitskySanctions#contribution-CA0C864C-B859-44DB-9395-F84B1F9FF6B1>

<sup>86</sup> "City Football Group: Ownership". City Football Group.

<https://www.cityfootballgroup.com/company#:~:text=CFG%20is%20majority%20owned%20by,technology%20investment%20firm%2C%20Silver%20Lake>.

<sup>87</sup> "A Letter to the City Fans From Sheikh Mansour", Manchester City website, 18 September 2008, <https://www.mancity.com/news/club-news/club-news/2018/september/hh-sheikh-mansour-letter-2008>

